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Arctic Warming: Environmental,
Human, and Security Implications
Mary Beth West*
ABSTRACT

Arctic warming has myriad implications for the Arctic
environment, residents, and nations.
Although definitive
predictions are difficult, without question the scope and rapidity
of change will test the adaptive capacities of the Arctic
environment as well as its residents. Warming is affecting
marine ecosystems and marine life, terrestrial ecosystems, and
the animals and people who depend on them. Human impacts
include effects on access to food and resources; health and
wellbeing; and community cohesion, traditions, and culture.
Increased shipping and resource activity create the need for
additional maritime presence and security; better environmental
and safety regulations;peaceful resolution of boundary disputes
and jurisdictionalissues; and increased homeland security, law
enforcement, immigration,public health, and related activities.
The response to many of these challenges must be international
and cooperative, should involve indigenous voices, and can be
accomplished within existing legal and institutional
frameworks by strengtheninginstitutions and developing legally
binding measures in several specific areas such as the
regulation of shipping, oil and gas activity, and fishing for the
purposes of safety, security, and ecosystem protection.

Mary Beth West was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries, with
rank of Ambassador in the U.S. Department of State from 1996-2003, where her
responsibilities included polar issues. Prior to that position, she practiced public
international law in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the State Department. Ms. West,
who is now a consultant on international environmental and related issues, has a B.A.
from the University of Michigan and a J.D. from Stanford Law School.
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INTRODUCTION

Arctic warming in the Arctic is having and will continue to have
myriad implications for the Arctic environment, residents, and
nations. Changes may be both negative and positive. The complexity
of interacting factors affecting the Arctic and the fact that much is
still unknown about the operation of climate and environmental
systems in the region make definitive predictions difficult. Without
question, however, the rapid change brought about by warming will
test the adaptive capacities of both the Arctic environment and its
residents, communities, and nations. This Article contains a general
description of the types of expected effects on the Arctic environment,
the social and economic well-being of its people, and the security of
Arctic nations.
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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS

During the twentieth century, air temperatures over Arctic land
areas increased by up to 5oC. 1 According to the Arctic Council's 2004
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA),2 during the twenty-first
century, under a moderate emissions scenario, average annual
temperatures in Alaska and western Canada are expected to rise by
3-5oC (5-90F) over land and up to 70C (13°F) over the oceans. 3 Winter
temperatures are expected to rise even more: 4-70C (7-13oF) over
land and 7-10oC (13-18oF) over the oceans. 4 The more recent 2007
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment
Report (IPCC Report) predicts an averaged warming in the Arctic of
2°C to about 9°C by the year 2100. 5 The increase in temperature will
have significant effects on the oceans, sea ice, permafrost, forests,
6
freshwater lakes and rivers, and flora and fauna in the region.
Warming is more rapid and intense in the Arctic than in other
areas of the globe due to unique conditions in the region. Melting
snow and ice reduce reflectivity levels, causing more sunlight to be
absorbed as heat and less sunlight to be reflected. 7 In addition, the
thawing of the permafrost is likely to lead to additional greenhouse
gas emissions.8 These and other related factors, such as Arctic cloud
feedback, not only create intensified warming in the Arctic region but
also have implications for the global climate system. 9

1.
Oleg A. Anisimov et al., Polar Regions (Arctic and Antarctic), in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 653, 656 (Martin Parry et
al. eds., 2007), available at www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment.report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2chapter15.pdf.
2.
SUSAN JOY HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE
IMPACT ASSESSMENT: HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2004), http://www.amap.no/acia/Highlights.pdf.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 662.
6.
See id. at 662-69 (discussing the effects of temperatures warming in the
arctic, including the "projected changes in the ocean," the expected impact of thawing
permafrost, the resultant impact on freshwater systems, and the "projected changes in
biodiversity, vegetation zones, and productivity").
7.
HASSOL, supra note 2, at 5.
8.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 661.
9.
See Gunter Weller et al., Summary and Synthesis of the ACIA, in ARCTIC
CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 989, 994 (Carolyn Symon et al.eds., 2004), available at
http://www.acia.uaf.edu/pages/scientific.html (noting that ice-albedo, snow-albedo and
arctic cloud feedbacks affect the Arctic climate and influence global climate change by
amplifying the melting of glaciers and ice sheets); see also Anisimov et al., supra note 1,
at 661-62 (discussing how "regional direct impacts may have global implications
through the following processes and feedbacks: [rieflectivity of snow ice and
vegetation;" "[rietreat of glaciers and ice sheets, freshwater runoff, sea level and ocean
circulation;" "Arctic terrestrial carbon flux;" "[m]igrating species;" "n[m]ethane
hydrates;" and "[s]outhern ocean carbon flux.").
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Warming in the Arctic, however, is not uniform. According to the
ACIA, observational data from the scientific record-supported by
indigenous observations-indicate that some areas such as Alaska,
western Canada, and Eurasia are warming more than others (e.g.,
eastern Canada, Greenland, and the northwest Atlantic). 10 Effects of
warming also differ within regions according to the geography,
ecology, and related circumstances of various areas.1 1 To be most
effective, therefore, responses must reflect the particular
circumstances of each place.
A. Melting Ice and Sea Level Rise
Melting ice and freshwater flowing into polar oceans have a
direct effect on sea levels. "Over the past 30 years, the annual
average sea-ice extent has decreased by about 8%, or nearly one
million-square kilometers, an area larger than all of Norway, Sweden,
and Denmark (or Texas and Arizona) combined .... ,,12 "Sea-ice
extent in summer has declined more . . .than the annual average,
with a loss of 15-20% of late-summer ice coverage. '13 Moreover, the
melting trend is accelerating. "Additional declines of 10-50% in
annual average sea-ice extent are projected by 2100," with summer
sea ice projected to decline more than 50% by late this century and
some models showing a complete disappearance of summer sea ice
14
during this period.
Global average sea level rise has been about eight centimeters
(three inches) in the past twenty years-an amount that is projected
to increase to 10-90 centimeters (four inches to three feet) during this
Models indicate that the Greenland ice sheet may
century. 15
eventually melt completely, resulting in a sea level rise of as much as
twenty-three feet. 16 Scientists also note the possibility that changes
in ocean chemistry caused by melting ice and increasing flow from
Arctic freshwater systems into the oceans could eventually affect
ocean conveyor systems, which convey warm water from the tropics
17
northward and are critical to the stability of the Earth's climate.

10.
Henry Huntington & Shari Fox, The Changing Arctic: Indigenous
Perspectives, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 61, 67.
11.
See Weller et al., supra note 9, at 1003 ("Observations also indicate that the
climate is presently changing quite differently in each of these [Arctic] regions, and
even within them, especially where there are pronounced variations in terrain .....
HASSOL, supra note 2, at 3.
12.
13.
Id.
Id.
14.
15.
Id. at 4.
16.
Id.
Id. at 5; see also, Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 664 ("The cumulative
17.
effect of these increasing freshwater supplies on the thermohaline circulation remains
unclear but is a critical area of concern.").

20091

THE IMPLICA TIONS OF ARCTIC WARNING

1083

These changes have a number of secondary effects. Perhaps the
most direct is their effect on marine ecosystems. For example,
warmer water and related runoff from land and rivers may alter
ocean chemistry and ecology,' 8 creating increased risk of infestations;
affecting fish, marine mammals, and animals that are dependent on
sea ice for feeding and daily activities; and potentially harming the
people who depend on those marine life and animals for
subsistence. 19
"As the sea ice edge moves farther north, the
distribution of crustaceans ... adapted for life at the sea ice edge and
fish... that forage on them shifts accordingly," affecting predators
that are dependent on sea ice for feeding and breeding. 20 Ringed
seals, walruses, and polar bears, which use sea ice as feeding and
resting platforms, and bowhead whales, which are dependent on sea
ice organisms for food, are among those affected 21 ; in fact, polar bears
were designated as threatened under the Endangered Species Act in
May 2008.22

While melting ice and related changes create significant stress
for some marine species and their predators, the impacts on Arctic
fisheries will be regionally specific-in some cases beneficial and in
others detrimental. 23 As a general matter, warming is causing a
change from Arctic to Subarctic conditions in the marine
environment, as a pelagic-dominated marine ecosystem previously in
the southeastern Bering Sea moves northward. 24 Some fishing
communities may thus experience beneficial effects as increasing
areas of open water bring to the Arctic more commercial fish stocks,
such as cod and herring in the north Atlantic and walleye pollock in
the Bering Sea. 2 5 On the other hand, some coldwater species, such as
shrimp and king crab, may suffer habitat loss and become less
plentiful. 26 In addition, the movement of fish stocks and other
marine life into new areas will affect the interrelationships among
components of ecosystems in new ways; for example, as salmon
sharks move farther north into the Bering Sea, they may compete for
resources with threatened marine mammals such as the Steller Sea
Lion. 27 As a general matter, the complex interactions in food webs
may generate secondary effects that are not always easy to predict.

18.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 664-65.
19.
Id. at 665-66.
20.
Id. at 668.
21.
Id. at 668-69.
22.
Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear, 73 Fed. Reg.
28,212, 28,212 (May 15, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)).
23.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 655.
24.
Id. at 659.
25.
Id. at 669. These species already comprise about 70 % of total catch in these
areas. Id.
26.
Id.
27.
Huntington & Fox, supra note 10, at 77.
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In addition to its effects on the marine ecosystem, loss of sea ice
also affects activities on land. In many areas, sea ice forms a barrier
for the coast, protecting it from waves and surges. 28 When that
barrier disappears, ocean activity can lead to severe erosion,
sedimentation, and related damage to coastal communities and
areas. 29 For example, the small island of Nelson Lagoon in the
Pribilofs has for years battled effects of winter storms by building
increasingly strong break walls along the shore.3 0 The walls were
designed to brace shore ice, which would in turn provide a buffer from
winter storm wave action. 3 1 Because the sea ice buffer has been lost,
however, the full force of waves now surges against the wall, leading
32
to breaks in some sections that have caused harm to the village.
caused
Vital infrastructure has also been disrupted: a storm in 2000
33
a breach in a pipeline carrying drinking water to the village.
Furthermore, as has been widely reported and discussed, sea
level rise over time will have devastating impacts on islands and lowlying coastal areas, including communities close to the sea.
B. Changes in Weather and Precipitation
Weather, in general, has become more variable and less
predictable by traditional means. 34 For example, elders in Kotzebue,
Alaska, have reported that weather may vary as much as 350C from
day to day without warning. 35 Precipitation has increased over the
past century, although the trends are small (about 1% per decade),
variable from area to area, and uncertain because of deficiencies in
the precipitation measurement network and the difficulty of
36
in windy polar areas.
obtaining accurate measurements
of large Siberian
Observations in some regions, such as the watershed
3 7
precipitation.
in
increases
show
not
rivers, do

Id. at 76.
28.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 672 (discussing how erosion has
29.
contributed "a significant proportion of regional sediment... to the marine
environment" and damaged property causing relocation and abandonment or
structures).
Huntington & Fox, supra note 10, at 76.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 77.
33.
Id. at 82; CTR. FOR INT'L CLIMATE AND ENVTL. RESEARCH-OSLO, FACT
34.
SHEET 4: How WILL CLIMATE CHANGES AFFECT INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES?,

http://acia.cicero.uio.no/factsheets/4-indigenous-communities.pdf
2009).
Huntington & Fox, supra note 10, at 74.
35.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, 657.
36.
Weller et al., supra note 9, at 992.
37.

(last visited Oct. 3,
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C. Thawing Permafrost
Increased temperatures are causing thawing of the permafrost
and undermining stable support for houses, buildings, and other
infrastructure such as roads, airports, and pipelines. 38
Models
indicate that by the mid-twenty-first century, the permafrost area in
39
the Northern Hemisphere may decrease by as much as 20-35%.
Even today the effects are very real. For example, it was reported in
2007 that in Shishmaref, Alaska, a small Inuit village on the Chukchi
Sea, thawing permafrost and sea erosion had produced the following
effects: three houses had fallen into the sea; seven houses had been
relocated; rising seawater had almost reached the airport runway; the
fuel tank farm, which seven years prior had been 300 feet from the
sea, was now only thirty-five feet from the water; seawater was
within eight feet of the town dump, creating a risk of long-lasting
pollution in the nearby marine environment if the dump were
inundated; and advancing seawater had contaminated the village's
40
drinking water supply.
D. Arctic FreshwaterSystems
Although some freshwater systems are entirely contained within
41
the Arctic, others are fed by river and lake systems further south.
The Arctic also contains numerous still-water systems, ranging from
large lakes to shallow tundra ponds. 42 Warming and the consequent
changes in precipitation, permafrost, and forests significantly affect
such freshwater systems and their resources. 43
While Arctic
freshwater ecosystems have been able to adapt to climate variations
in the past, the high magnitude and rapid rate of change over the
next 100 years will probably exceed the ability of such ecosystems to
adapt, leading to significant changes-some positive but most

38.
Permafrost is defined as "sub-surface earth materials that remain at or
below 0oC continuously for two or more years." Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 660.
Thawing of the permafrost may also have a second effect that is not discussed here"feedback to the global climate system through potential emission of greenhouse
gases." Id. at 661.
39.
Id. at 663.
40.
CIEL, Climate Change and Arctic Impacts, http://www.ciel.org/Climate/
ClimateArctic.html#2 (last visited Oct. 3, 2009); see also Anisimov et al., supra note 1,
at 672 ("[I]n Shishmaref... the combined effects of reduced sea ice, thawing
permafrost, storm surges and waves have led to significant loss of property, and this
has led to the relocation or abandonment of homes and other facilities.").
41.
Anisimov et al., supranote 1, at 663.
42.
Id. at 664.
43.
See id. at 660, 664 (discussing the impact of climate variability and the
related effects, i.e. "seasonal shifts in flow, ice cover, precipitation/evapotranspiration
and inputs of sediment and nutrients," thawing permafrost, and changes in vegetation
cover, on freshwater systems and their resources).
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probably negative. 44 In some areas, such as Siberia, scientists have
observed a pattern of lake disappearance. 45 In Nunavut in the
Canadian Arctic, researchers have reported that water levels in
Baker Lake are decreasing, blocking travel in some areas and
rendering hunters unable to get to traditional caribou hunting
grounds and camping areas. 46 Elders from the Yukon have also
up or becoming choked
reported that lakes and streams are drying
47
with weeds, making the water undrinkable.
Alterations in biodiversity and productivity relationships as well
as changes in contaminant pathways are also affecting aquatic
Scientists predict that more
species such as freshwater fish.48
southerly species will colonize Arctic areas, bringing new parasites
and diseases to which Arctic species are not adapted, thereby
increasing mortality.49 The movements of "anadromous fish, which
migrate up rivers from the sea to spawn in freshwater, will [also]
shift as oceanic conditions and freshwater drainage patterns
change."50 Species such as Arctic char may experience population
reductions due to reproductive failures, habitat changes, and
predation from colonizing species. 5 1 The IPCC Report finds it
unlikely that changes in freshwater systems will be "offset by
increased opportunity for freshwater acquaculture resulting from
Thus, conserving Arctic aquatic biodiversity and
warming."52
ensuring the sustainable use of Arctic freshwater species will present
significant challenges for Arctic residents, resource managers, and
53
policymakers.
E. TerrestrialEcosystems: Forests and Farms
According to the IPCC, the adaptive capacity of Arctic
ecosystems will be limited because the extent of those systems is
likely to be reduced by compression between the general northward
expansion of forests and the current coastline, increased flooding of
northern coastal wetlands as the sea level rises, and loss of habitat to
land use. 54 Indeed, the IPCC found the evidence of recent vegetation
change compelling: "[A]long the Arctic to sub-Arctic boundary, the
tree line has moved about ten kilometers northwards," and forest has

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 663.
Id. at 664.
Huntington & Fox, supra note 10, at 83.
Id. at 77-78.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 665.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 666.
Id.
Id. at 659.
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displaced 2% of the tundra on Alaska's Seward Peninsula in the past
fifty years. 55 While shrubs and "greenness" have increased in some
places, such as on the North Slope of Alaska, 56 in other areas such as
parts of the Russian European Arctic bog growth has caused tree
death. 57 The changes in forest and tundra ecosystems caused by
warming have led to insect outbreaks, increased incidence of forest
fires, and infestations. For example, on the Kenai Peninsula in
Alaska, an infestation of spruce bark beetles has caused
approximately 2.3 million acres of tree mortality. 58 At the 2007
Intergovernmental Climate Change meeting in Bali, indigenous
leaders from northern British Columbia highlighted a serious
invasion by the Mountain Pine Beetle. 59 Spruce budworm has also
reproduced further north, and autumn moth defoliation of mountain
60
birch trees has occurred over wide areas.
On the other hand, there is also evidence of changes in growing
season duration, timing, and productivity. 61 Although patterns are
variable, Arctic warming in some areas is creating possibilities for
agriculture on lands where such possibilities did not exist
previously. 62 In addition, greater access to fish, timber, and minerals
63
is evident in some locations.
F. Floraand Fauna
Many Arctic species are particularly vulnerable to warming
because they are specialized and have adapted to Arctic conditions in
ways that may make them poor competitors with species from more
benign climates. 64 Others require specific conditions such as the
existence of sea ice to survive. 65 Moreover, warming is not the only

55.
Id. at 666.
56.
Martin Jeffries, Nat'l Sci. Found., Office of Polar Programs, Presentation to
the Symposium: Impact of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and Maritime
Operations
(July
10-12,
2007),
www.star.nesdis.noaa.gov/star/documents/
2007IceSymp/Jeffries.pdf (PowerPoint presentation).
57.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 666.
58.
CIEL, supra note 40; see also Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 667 (noting
the Kenai Peninsula's loss of 10-20% of its forest tundra as a result of a spruce bark
beetle outbreak in the 1990s).
59.
Geoffirey York, Indigenous People DescribeReal Perils of Global Warming, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL (Ontario, Can.), Dec. 14, 2007, available at http://www.manystrong
voices.orgl ressite/fileMedia%20coverage/Geoffrey%2York%20article%20Dec%20142007.pdf.
60.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 667.
61.
Id. at 666.
62.
Id. at 668.
63.
Scott Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications
of Global Warming, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 1, available at
http://foreignaffairs.org/2008O3Olfaessay87206-pO/scott-g-borgersorLarctic-meltdown.html.
64.
Anisimov et al., supranote 1, at 658.
65.
Id. at 658.
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factor; many species are facing multiple, concurrent, human and
climate-induced stresses.6 6 "Loss of a keystone species could have
'67
cascading effects on entire ecosystems.
Impacts include effects on plants and berries as well as on
wildlife such as fox, birds, caribou, and reindeer. 68 For example,
"[i]cing events during warmer winters that restrict access to frozen
vegetation have impacted some reindeer/caribou populations and
high-Arctic musk oxen populations. '6 9 New species that could not
previously live in the Arctic environment will enter, and some such as
the North American mink and certain southern plant species may
become invasive. 70
Invasive species and parasites heretofore
unknown in the Arctic will affect both flora and fauna.

III.

HUMAN IMPLICATIONS

'71
"The Arctic is now home to approximately 4 million residents.
Although the makeup of populations varies from area to area,
migration into the Arctic in the twentieth century resulted in a
reduction of the proportion of indigenous inhabitants to about 10% of
72
the overall population by the early part of the twenty-first century.
Developments in the twentieth century also brought about various
forms of social, cultural, and economic change.
For example,
"[i]ndigenous residents have, in most regions, been encouraged to

settle in fixed communities

....

,,73

Although many residents and

communities still retain and maintain strong relationships with the
land and sea, this settlement policy has had negative effects on
subsistence activities. 74 "At the same time, Arctic residents have
experienced an increase in access to treated water, sewage disposal,
and health care facilities and services," as well as greater access to
market food sources. 75 "In general, the Arctic has a young, rapidly
growing population with higher birth rates than national averages,
76
and rising but lower than national average life-expectancy."

66.
Id.
67.
Id. (citation omitted).
68.
See id. at 666 (describing the impact of climate changes on Artic species
and vegetation).
69.
Id. (citation omitted).
70.
Id. at 667.
71.
Id. at 657 (citation omitted).
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
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On average, one-third of the Arctic population lives in
settlements with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants.7 7 Arctic communities,
particularly coastal indigenous communities with a subsistence way
of life, are vulnerable to the effects of warming. This vulnerability
flows from the close relationships of community residents to the land
and their reliance on local environments for aspects of everyday life
such as diet and economy.7 8
The degree of "vulnerability and
resilience of each group and community differ greatly from place to
'79
place and time to time.
The Arctic people, whose ancestors have inhabited the region for
thousands of years, are known to have an extremely high adaptive
capacity and history; many residents and communities have already
initiated changes in behaviors, such as shifting the times or locations
of hunting or other activities.80 Some aspects of adaptive capacity,
however, have been constrained by (1) today's more settled lifestyle;
(2) increased participation in wage-economy jobs, which reduces
mobility as well as time on the land observing and developing the
knowledge that strengthens adaptation; and (3) the current state of
social, economic, and political changes in the region.8 1 Furthermore,
the nature and breadth of the current changes, the rapidity with
which they are occurring, and the unpredictability of the effects will
surely test the adaptive capacity of even the most creative and
resilient populations.
Arctic indigenous communities, of course, are not monolithic. 8 2
Ancestry, history, language, families, and traditions vary from
community to community and region to region-from the Saami in
northern Europe to the Inupiat, Aleut, and Yupik, and others in
Alaska; the Inuit, Inuvialuit, Dene, and Gwich'in, and others in
Canada; the Kalaallit and Inughuit in Greenland; and the Chukchi,
Nenet, Yakuts, and others in Russia.8 3 Indigenous groups have
distinct cultures, languages, traditions, and ways of interacting with
their neighbors and environments, but they also have in common
close connections to their surroundings, intimate understandings of
their environments, complex relationships with governments and
non-indigenous migrants to the Arctic, a way of life that mixes

77.
See id. (stating that, on average, two-thirds of the Arctic population lives in
communities with more than 5,000 inhabitants).
78.
Id. at 661.
79.
Huntington & Fox, supra note 10, at 92.
80.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 655.
81.
Id. at 661.
82.
Huntington & Fox, supra note 10, at 62.
83.
This is only a partial list of the many indigenous communities in the Arctic.
See Yvon Csonka & Peter Schweitzer, Societies and Cultures: Change and Persistence,
in ARCTIc HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 45, 47, 53 (Niels Einarsson et al. eds., 2004)
(provides a map, chart, and discussion of the various language families of Arctic
indigenous populations).
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modern and traditional activities, and a major stake in the future of
the region.8 4 "The impact of projected climate change on the diverse
communities of the Arctic can only be understood in the context of the
interconnected social, cultural, political and economic forces acting on
them."8 5 Moreover, the implications of warming for Arctic residents
extend beyond the economy and social life to the culture and
traditions of Arctic indigenous communities. In a submission to the
United States Senate, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference publicly
86
argued that climate change will lead to loss of culture and identity.
The discussion below highlights some of the ways in which Arctic
residents-including indigenous peoples-are being affected by Arctic
warming.
A. Access to Food and Resources
"Per capita consumption of wild foods by rural Alaskans is
[approximately] 465 grams per day and consumption by urban
Alaskans is 60 grams per day." 87 "The collective value of these foods
in the state is estimated at approximately US$200 million/yr. 8 8 In
Canada, Arctic communities consume between "106 grams per day
and 440 grams per day of wild foods, accounting for 6-40% of total
energy intake and 7-10% of household income in Nunavik and
Nunavut. ''8 9 "[R]esources [involved] include caribou/reindeer, moose,
musk ox, migratory birds and their eggs, and plants and berries." 90
"Wood, sods, peat and coal are used locally as fuels .... " 91
Arctic warming is endangering many Arctic aboriginal people's
ability to hunt. Inuit leaders at the 2007 Bali Climate Change
meeting described the effects on their villages. 92 They reported that
fragile ice is threatening migration patterns-even the very
existence-of some of the animals on which villages rely for food and
endangering the hunters attempting to find those animals. 93 Shifting
weather and severe, increasingly frequent storms further complicate
the hunt. 94 According to Inuit leaders, it is now difficult to predict

84.
See id. at 64 (discussing pan-Arctic identity and the influence of
information and communication technology).
85.
Anisimov et al., supranote 1, at 671 (citation omitted).
86.
Id. at 661 (citing Impacts of Climate Change: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
Commerce, Scir. & Tech., 107th Cong. (2004), available at www.ciel.org/Publications/
McCainHearingSpeechl5SeptO4.pdf) (testimony of Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair, Inuit
Circumpolar Conference).
87.
Id. at 668.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. (citation omitted).
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
York, supra note 59.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
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the movement of caribou. 95 Some Inuit have made changes to their
hunting patterns, the times of the year in which they travel on land,
96
and their collection of winter wood and other supplies.
On the other hand, as noted above, warming is likely to increase
the opportunity for expansion of agriculture and forestry. The extent
of these effects is not yet known; nor is it clear whether and to what
extent markets and infrastructure will exist to take advantage of
agriculture and forestry opportunities.
B. Health
Arctic warming has numerous implications for human health.
Direct effects flow from exposure to temperature extremes and
weather events. For example, respiratory stress has been reported
from extreme warm summer days, and effects such as frostbite and
97
hypothermia are increasing due to weather unpredictability.
Increases in precipitation affect the frequency and magnitude of
natural disasters such as avalanches and rock falls. 98 On the other
hand, warming during the Arctic winter months may also reduce
deaths from cardiovascular and respiratory conditions often
99
associated with extreme winter cold.
Indirect effects include the possibility of increased injuries,
accidents, and diseases related to changing environmental conditions
such as thinning and earlier breakup of ice and greater exposure to
chemicals.1 00 Illnesses transmitted to marine mammals, birds, and
fish in changing waters and ecosystems may, in turn, be transmitted
to humans, particularly through subsistence diets. 01' At the same
time, to the extent that warming and other economic and social
changes are leading to increased transition to market foods, scientists
point out that market food diets have been associated with a rise in
levels of cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, and obesity. 10 2 Improved
agriculture, on the other hand, could make healthy foods more
available. In view of the interactions of so many interconnected
factors, it is difficult to predict with certainty how diets will change
and to what extent health will be affected.
Warming also threatens community and public health
infrastructures, particularly in low-lying Arctic communities.
"Community water sources may be subject to salt-water intrusion and

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 671.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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bacterial contamination. '10 3 Waste contamination may also occur, as
indicated in the Shishmaref example noted above.10 4 On the other
hand, in some areas water treatment efficiencies may also improve
05
due to warmer water temperatures.1
C. Community Cohesion, Traditions,and Culture
While Arctic warming is only one of many factors transforming
Arctic communities, its effects are very real. As noted above, physical
changes such as shifts in resources and the stability of community
infrastructure have led to the need for migration or relocation of
community residents and the alteration of life patterns such as
hunting and gathering of supplies. These physical changes challenge
the relationships of individuals and communities to the local
environments that have been the basis of their identity, culture, and
well-being for centuries. At the same time, ongoing changes in
economies and societies globally are creating pressures that threaten
to erode traditional ways of living.
The loss of traditions caused by such pressures can, in turn,
erode the culture of Arctic people and communities, leading to
psychological distress and anxiety in some cases.' 0 6 Describing the
ways in which increasing weather variability and unpredictability
have affected their elders, Inuit researchers from Nunavut in the
Canadian Arctic note that because elders can no longer predict the
weather they perceive themselves as losing their traditional advisory
roles in their communities.' 0 7 Discussing the effects of climate-driven
changes on hunting, natural resources, and loss of traditional
knowledge, the IPCC notes, "Together these shifts are turning
previously well-adapted Arctic peoples into 'strangers in their own
lands. ' " 0 8
While Native cultures are adaptive and constantly
changing, perhaps one of the most critical needs is to find methods of
adaptation that preserve indigenous culture to the greatest degree
possible in the face of rapid and extensive change.
D. Importanceof Indigenous Wisdom
Arctic researchers and policymakers are increasingly recognizing
the importance of indigenous voices in assessing changes in the Arctic

103.
Id. at 672.
Id.
104.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Huntington & Fox, supra note 10, at 82.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 668 (citing Fikret Berkes, Epilogue:
108.
Making Sense of Arctic Environmental Change?, in THE EARTH iS FASTER NOW:
INDIGENOUS OBSERVATIONS OF ARCTIc ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, 335, 339 (Igor
Krupnik & Dyanna Jolly eds., 2002)).
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and in addressing adaptation.
Indigenous residents bring an
intimate
understanding
of natural
phenomena
and
the
interrelationships between nature and the human population, a deep
understanding of community structure and other factors that affect
adaptation, and a perspective that dates back many generations. As
the IPCC Report notes, "The effectiveness of local adaptive strategies
is uneven across the Arctic and there are large gaps in knowledge
about why some communities do well, while others are more
vulnerable to drivers of change, even when they share similar
resources and ecological settlings."'10 9 Indigenous knowledge and
wisdom can be critical to filling these gaps. 110
E. Case Study: Indigenous Perspectives from Kotzebue, Alaska
Specificity of knowledge and a practical, balanced approach can
be seen in the assessments of indigenous residents reported in a case
study done by the residents of Kotzebue, Alaska, an Inupiaq
community on the Baldwin Peninsula thirty miles above the Arctic
Circle in North West Alaska. 111 Kotzebue residents described a wide
variety of specific impacts of warming from 1950 to the present.
For hunters, in particular, weather has an important effect on
daily activity.
Residents reported that seasons are now less
consistent, with more mid-winter fog and high temperatures in
winter, but lower temperatures in summer months. 112 They also
reported more extreme daily weather changes.
"It is relatively
common for the temperature to change from -350C one day to OoC the
next or vice versa. ''113 In November 1999 and 2001, Kotzebue
experienced 100 times less than the average amount of rain recorded
for that month over the last fifty years. 114
This type of
unpredictability affects the life activities of the indigenous residents
115
of Kotzebue far more than it would affect urban residents.
However, the hunters also reported that climate change was not
necessarily bad. Due to lichen cycles and decreased competition from
reindeer, among other factors, the area now has caribou that it did
not have earlier in the twentieth century; moose also began to appear
in the 1950s. 116 These types of changes have helped improve quality
of life.

109.
Id. at 673.
110.
See Huntington & Fox, supra note 10, at. 64-66 (discussing the meaning of
the terms "indigenous knowledge" and "indigenous wisdom" and their relevance to
Arctic assessment and policymaking).
111.
Id. at 73-76.
112.
Id. at 74.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
116.
Id. at 73.
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The case study looks, in particular, at the impacts of late freezeup. Residents reported that late freeze-up has led to better whitefish
harvests, clamming, spotted seal hunting, access to caribou, and
access to firewood. They also said, however, that late freeze-up has
led to a shorter ice-fishing season, poor access to Kotzebue, greater
danger to those living outside Kotzebue resulting from rough ice and
thin ice conditions, and more erosion and flood problems. 11 7 The
shorter ice fishing season was described as particularly difficult for
the community because ice fishing is an important social activity that
binds the community and gives the elders and young people the rare
opportunity during the year to harvest traditional foods."18
Community members also discussed the effects of late freeze-up
on marine and land animals. For the spotted seal, late freeze-up has
meant better access to inshore waters and fish and improved haulouts for rest, but it has also meant greater risk of being trapped too
far from open water when the ice begins to thicken.1 19 For caribou, it
has contributed to slower movements and less likelihood of travelling
long distances. 120 For red foxes, it has led to better feeding but has
121
also increased competition with Arctic foxes.
Because of the breadth and depth of their knowledge, the
practicality of their approaches, and the fact that they are directly
affected by the changes brought about by warming, it is important
that indigenous inhabitants of the Arctic be a part of any research
into the effects of warming as well as a part of policymaking for
adaptation and mitigation. Both researchers and policymakers need
to learn from indigenous perspectives.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

New security challenges for the United States and other Arctic
nations will arise from increased access to Arctic waters, the effects of
warming on Arctic infrastructure, including oil and gas
infrastructure, and environmental changes and their effects on the
stability of the Arctic environment and the well-being of its people.
In addition, traditional security issues, such as missile defense and
early warning, as well as nuclear deterrence, defense, and clean-up in
122
the Arctic continue to exist.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 75.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.

Id.
Id. at 76.

122.
See ROB HUEBERT, ARCTIC SECURITY: DIFFERENT THREATS AND DIFFERENT
RESPONSES
3-5 (2004), http://www.nrf.is/Publications/The%20Resilient%2ONorth/

Plenary%204/3rd%20NRFPlenary%204PPHuebert.pdf
(discussing the evolution
environmental and human security in the Arctic from the Cold War to present).
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A. Marine and TerritorialSecurity
Warming and melting sea ice will open Arctic waters to
increased vessel traffic. While estimates vary, some projections
suggest that by 2050, the Northern Sea Route, which follows the
northern coastline of Russia, may have as many as 125 days per year
with less than a 75% sea-ice cover, creating favorable conditions for
navigation by ice-strengthened ships. 123 The Northwest Passage
above Canada is also becoming less ice-bound. 124
Because the
opening of Arctic shipping routes offers the possibility of significant
decreases in time, distance, and cost from current routes through the
Suez and Panama Canals, increasing interest is being generated
among Asian exporting nations such as China, India, Japan, and
South Korea. 125 Arctic sea routes may also be used for transport of
oil and gas from the region. Increased traffic through the Arctic,
however, will likely occur gradually over time as the ice recedes,
appropriate ice-strengthened vessels are constructed, and insurance
issues are resolved.
To date, Arctic waters have not been well charted or fully
regulated for traffic, safety, and security. Increased traffic and
activity in Arctic waters will create the need for better charting,
improved marine traffic regulation, and increased monitoring of
traffic in order to detect and stop hostile intrusions. The choke point
leading from the Bering Sea into the Arctic is one area of concern for
the United States, but other areas will need attention as well.
Oil and gas exploration and exploitation will grow as those
activities become feasible in Arctic waters. According to a 2008
United States Geological Survey study, the Arctic may hold as much
as 90 billion recoverable barrels of oil and nearly 2 trillion cubic feet
of recoverable natural gas, based on current industry capabilities and
practices-approximately 13% of the world's undiscovered oil, 30% of
its undiscovered natural gas, and 20% of its undiscovered natural gas
liquids. 126 New technology may make it possible to both drill in deep
Arctic waters with drills that sit on the ocean floor and pipe the oil or
gas into ice-breaker tankers or LNG tankers. 12 7 The laying of fiber-

123.
Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 676; Anthony Russell, Carpe Diem: Seizing
Strategic Opportunity in the Artic, 51 JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY 94, 96 (2008).
124. Id.
125.
See Russell, supra note 123, at 96 (discussing benefits to Asian nations of a
reliable arctic passage).
126.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 90 Billion
Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic (July
23, 2008), available at http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?.ID=1980&from+iss_
home.
127.
See Robotics Trend Staff, Energid Technologies to Control Innovative
Drilling Robots for
Seabed Rig, ROBOTICS
TRENDS,
May
29,
2009,
http://www.roboticstrends.com/service-robotics/article/energidtechnologies to-control_
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as Prudhoe Bay and
optic cable between areas in the Arctic, such
128
Norway or Iceland, may also become possible.
New access to and uses of Arctic waters will add urgency to the
need to settle bilateral boundary disputes in the area, decide rights to
areas of extended continental shelf in the Arctic, and address
disputes about the status of certain waters. Boundary disputes have
existed for years between the United States and Canada in the
Beaufort Sea, Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, and Canada
and Denmark relating to Hans Island. 129 Disputes also exist with
regard to navigational rights in the Northwest Passage and the
Northern Sea Route. 130 Canada claims that the Northwest Passage
comprises Canadian internal waters, subject to the full requirements
of Canadian law, while the United States and other maritime powers
take the position that these waters are subject to the transit passage
regime applicable to straits used for international navigation under
Similar concerns exist with regard to
the law of the sea. 131
132
navigational rights through the Northern Sea Route.
Rights to extended continental shelves beyond 200 miles are
being dealt with through national submissions to the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf under Article 76 of the Law of the
Sea Convention. For parties to the Convention, Article 76 establishes
a process, through the Commission, for coastal states to secure
international recognition of the outer boundaries of their shelves
where those shelves extend beyond 200 miles. 1 33 Russia and Norway
have already made submissions to the Commission, and other Arctic
nations are conducting the necessary geological and geophysical
studies to make such submissions in the near future. 134 Although the

innovative drilling-robotsfor-seabed-rig/ (describing a drilling rig that operates in
arctic environments).
Rob Stapleton, Trans-Arctic Shipping Nears Possibility as Ice Melts, ALA. J.
128.
COM., Nov. 18, 2007, available at http://alaskajournal.com/stories/lll807/hom20071118015.shtml (reporting statement by Mead Treadwell, chair of the U.S. Arctic
Research Commission, made at the Trade is Transportation seminar on November 7,
2007).
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/
129.
library/publications/the-world-factbookfields/2070.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
Id.
130.
131.
Doug Struck, Dispute Over NW PassageRevived, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp.dyn/content/article/2006/11/05/AR2006110500286.html.
132.
See CIA, The World Factbook, supra note 129.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 76, Dec. 10, 1982 1833 U.N.T.S.
133.
397, available at http://www.un.org/Deptsllos/convention-agreements/conventionoverviewconvention.htm. Under Article 76, the outer limits of the extended
continental shelves established on the basis of the Commission's recommendations
throughout this process become "final and binding" on all parties (156 nations and the
European Union, at the current time).
134 Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
http://www.un.org/Deptslos/clcsnew/commission_submissions.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2009).

2009]

THE IMPLICATIONS OFARCTIC WARNING

1099

United States has enormous areas of extended continental shelf
beyond 200 miles in the Arctic (and off of some portions of its Atlantic
coastline as well), the United States is not yet party to the
Convention. 135 In order to ensure that U.S. rights to its extended
continental shelf are on the firmest legal footing, as well as for many
other reasons, the United States should immediately become party to
136
the Convention.
Increased transportation, resource exploration and exploitation,
and other uses of polar waters will also open newly active land
borders for the United States and other Arctic nations. Issues related
to homeland security (terrorism), law enforcement (drug smuggling
and other activities), immigration (illegal entry), public health, and
other environmental effects will arise as a result of new ports; the
temporary influx of travelers; the more permanent influx of workers
and the
related to shipping, oil and gas activities, and tourism;
1 37
concomitant need for shore-based support infrastructure.
These elements of a more open Arctic will require the United
States to increase maritime presence and security operations,
including ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight in accordance
with the rules applicable under the international law of the sea. The
January 2009 National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic
policy commits the U.S. government to "develop[ing] greater
capabilities and capacity to protect the air, land, and sea borders in
the Arctic region; increas[ing] Arctic maritime domain awareness in
order to protect maritime commerce, critical infrastructure, and key

Bellinger: The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention,
135.
http://ilreports.blogspot.com/2008/1 1lbellinger-United-States-and-law-of-sea.html (Nov.
6, 2008, 08:57 EST) (transcribing a speech made by John Bellinger, Legal Adviser to
the U.S. Department of State at the University of California Berkley School of Law's
Law of the Sea Institute on Nov. 3, 2008).
As the nation with the world's largest navy, an extensive coastline, a
136.
continental shelf with enormous oil and gas reserves, and substantial fishing and
commercial shipping interests, it is clearly in the United States' national interest to
join the Law of the Sea Convention. See id. (providing reasons why the U.S. should join
the Law of the Sea Convention). Among the many reasons for joining is the fact that, as
a non-party, the United States cannot take its seat at the table as decisions affecting
the world's oceans are made. An example of particular relevance to the Arctic is that,
as a non-party, the United States cannot nominate a U.S. expert to sit on the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to aid in consideration of the claims
that are currently being presented by other Arctic states. Id.
137.
See Directive on Arctic Region Policy, 45 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 47, 48
(Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/search.html (select "2009
Presidential Documents" then search "Directive on Arctic Region Policy": then follow
PDF link) (asserting that the United States has a fundamental interest in preventing
vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region); OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS,
SECURING AMERICA'S BORDERS AT PORTS OF ENTRY (2006), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgovborder-security/port-activities/securing-ports/ent
ry-points.ctt/entry-points.pdf (discussing generally the security issues presented by
ports of entry into the United States).
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resources; preserv[ing] the global mobility of U.S. military and
civilian vessels and aircraft throughout the Arctic; protect[ing] a
sovereign U.S. maritime presence there;...
[and] encouraging
1 38
peaceful resolution of disputes in the region."'
Navy missions in an ice-free Arctic may include operations to
ensure freedom of navigation; transit of forces; forward presence,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; homeland defense;
scientific exploration; protection of natural resources; maintenance

and improvement of the capability to operate in the Arctic; and
upholding allied commitments. 13 9
Coast Guard Arctic missions,
which have traditionally included operations such as ice breaking, ice
patrol, Loran, fisheries enforcement and marine mammal protection,

Bering Sea patrols, and marine safety, will likely also be updated and
expanded. 140 According to a NOAA expert, the areas needing most
improvement in the Arctic are search and rescue, training in cold-

climate procedures, communications (land-based and satellite-based),
coastal land weather stations, satellite in-situ observations, and

military readiness. 141

New multi-mission platforms, including new

icebreakers and ice-strengthened vessels, will be needed for military,
law enforcement, rescue, research, and environmental responses.

Expanded cooperative efforts will also be necessary to regulate
marine traffic,

ensure safety, provide for search and rescue, and
Although some Arctic nations have traffic

protect the environment.

systems in place, cooperation will be necessary to achieve full and
consistent coverage. Likewise, cooperation will be needed between
and among entities such as the North American Ice Service (NAIS),
the Canadian Ice Service (CIS), the International Ice Patrol, the

International Arctic Buoy Program (IABP), the International Ice
142
Charting Working Group (IICWG), and others.

138.
Directive on Arctic Region Policy, supra note 137, at 49. The Russian
Security Council also released an Arctic policy for Russia on March 31, 2009. That
paper, entitled "The Fundamentals of Russian State Policy in the Arctic up to 2020 and
Beyond," includes deployment of military, border and coast guard units, as well as
increased cooperation with other countries in the fight against terrorism, drug
trafficking, illegal immigration, and environmental protection. Mia Bennett, Russia Plans
Military and Economic Development in Arctic, http://arctic.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/
03/31/russian-development-plans-in-arctic/ (Mar. 31, 2009, 06:10 EST).
139.
Elizabeth Chalecki, Climate Change in the Arctic and its Implications for
U.S. National Security, 2 IDEAS JOURNAL: INT'L DEV., ENV'T & SUSTAINABILITY 1, 4 (Apr.
2007), available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/ierp/ideas/pdfs/issue2/ChaleckiArctic.pdf.
140.
See U.S. Coast Guard, 17th Coast Guard District, The Emerging Arctic: A
New Maritime Frontier (2008), http://www.uscg.mil/history/docslArcticOverview[1].pdf
(PowerPoint presentation describing U.S. Coast Guard missions in the Arctic).
141.
Richard W. Spinrad, From 2001 to 2007: What We Have Learned and What
We Have Done
(July 10, 2007), http://www.star.nesdis.noaa.gov/star/documents/
2007IceSymp/Spinrad.pdf.
142.
See id. at 4 (presentation discusses the importance of developing
international science partnerships).
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B. Energy Security
Warming also raises the related security issue of the continued
viability and security of oil and gas infrastructure in the Arctic.
Melting permafrost and related environmental effects are already
creating vulnerabilities for roads, pipelines, and buildings needed to
support oil and gas development and transportation of those
resources out of the Arctic 143-an effect that will be exacerbated as
more buildings and structures carrying heat are built on the
permafrost. Investments necessary to ensure the continued viability
of critical energy infrastructure will need to be made in an
environmentally sustainable manner and in a manner that ensures
their security.
C. Environmentaland Human 'Security
As noted above, warming will have direct effects on the
environment and the health and well-being of Arctic residents. The
slow pace of natural recovery in the Arctic makes it critical to address
such effects as quickly as possible. In addition, the potential impacts
of intensified Arctic warming on the Earth's oceans and climate in
general make the need to address environmental change in the Arctic
even more critical. In creating the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy (AEPS) in the early 1990s to address concerns related to
transboundary pollution, the international community recognized the
importance of cooperative action to address Arctic environmental
security. 144 The Arctic Council, the successor organization to the
AEPS, maintains environmental protection and sustainable
145
development as one of its primary mandates.
Scientific research will be critical to environmental and human
security as well as to meeting broader national interests in the Arctic.
Promoting international scientific cooperation through the Arctic
Council and other bodies is a key element of the recent United States
146
Arctic Policy.

143.
See Anisimov et al., supra note 1, at 665-76 (discussing the impact of
climate change on resources and traditional economies).
144.
See About the Arctic Council, http://arctic-council.org/article/about (last
visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Arctic Council] (discussing the history of the Arctic
Council).
145.
Id.
146.
Id. at 50.
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V. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Because the causes of the environmental, social, and security
problems discussed in this Article cross international boundaries,
efforts to respond to them must be international and cooperative.
The final Part of this Article touches briefly on legal and institutional
issues related to the Arctic. Much has been written about a "race for
resources" and the "potential for conflict" in the Arctic, and some
authors have argued that a new, comprehensive Arctic treaty is
required.1 47 This Part describes briefly the legal and institutional
regime currently in place and takes the position that, while some new
agreements and cooperative mechanisms covering specific issues will
be needed, the current legal regime under the Law of the Sea
Convention forms a viable framework within which to deal with the
problems of a warmer and more open Arctic.
A. Current Legal and InstitutionalFramework
The Law of the Sea Convention sets forth the jurisdictional rules
governing the world's oceans and provides an extensive legal
148
framework for a host of issues relevant to the Arctic:
" It

sets forth the navigational rights and freedoms of
commercial and military vessels and aircraft in maritime
areas;

149

" It addresses the sovereignty of coastal states throughout the
world, including the Arctic coastal states, by setting forth the
limits of the territorial sea and the rules applicable in ocean
150
areas;
" It addresses sovereign resource rights by setting forth the
limits of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
and the rules governing those areas; 15 1
" It provides the geological criteria relevant to the
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf
beyond 200 miles and sets forth a procedure for securing
international recognition of those limits through the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf-a critical

147.
See, e.g., Scott Borgerson, supra note 63, at 1 (arguing that due to global
warming there is a need for an Arctic Treaty).
148.
The Convention covers the Arctic and in fact contains a specific article,
Article 234, on ice-covered areas. See Hans Corell, Reflections on the Possibilities and
Limitations of a Binding Legal Regime, 37 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 321, 321 (2007), available
at http://www.havc.se/res/SelectedMaterial/20070604corellarcticlegalregenvpolicyl.pdf
(arguing that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea applies in the
Arctic); Bellinger, supra note 135.
149.
Bellinger, supra note 135.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
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matter as the Arctic coastal states seek to extend their
respective outer continental shelves to the limits permissible
under international law. 152 International law, as reflected in
the Convention, also calls for peaceful resolution of disputes
where the maritime claims of coastal states overlap. As noted
153
above, several such disputes exist in the Arctic region;
Finally, the Convention sets forth rules regarding marine
scientific research in the Arctic as well as "the respective
rights and responsibilities among coastal states, flag states
and port states regarding protection of the marine
54
environment."1
In addition to the overall jurisdictional framework of the Law of
the Sea Convention, other conventions and agreements cover specific
issues. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) provides a
legal structure for development of rules relating to maritime
transportation. 155 The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants (POPS Convention) regulates transboundary pollution
from persistent organic pollutants, a significant problem in the
Arctic. 156 The Convention on the International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Convention on Long
Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its protocols, the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and other
conventions provide further mechanisms for international decision
157
making on issues important to the Arctic region.
In 2008, representatives of the five Arctic coastal states met in
Ilulissat, Greenland, where they issued a Declaration pledging
cooperation on a broad range of issues and reaffirming their
commitment to the existing international legal rules applicable to the
158
Arctic.
The Arctic Council plays a key role in research and policy
recommendations
concerning
environmental
protection
and
sustainable development in the Arctic.
The Council, originally

152.
Id. As noted above, the United States should become party to the
Convention so that it can ensure that its rights to continental shelf beyond 200 miles in
the Arctic can be protected under that procedure.
153.
CIA World Factbook, supranote 129.
154.
Bellinger, supra note 135.
155.
See id. (describing the role of the International Maritime Organization).
156.
See Corell, supra note 148, at 322 (asserting that environmental issues
such as threats to the ozone and emissions of greenhouse gases are the most important
issues that need to be addressed in the Arctic and citing the POPS Convention as an
example of a treaty governing that problem).
157.
See id. at 321 (discussing that there is already a legal regime for the
Arctic).
158.
Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Green., May 27-29, 2008, flulissat
Declaration, paras. 1-3, available at www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_
Declaration.pdf [Ilulissat Declaration].
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formed in 1991 as the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, is a
high-level intergovernmental consultative forum consisting of (1) the
eight nations with land territory above the Arctic Circle (the United
States, Canada, Russia, Denmark for Greenland, Iceland, Sweden,
Finland, and Norway); (2) Arctic indigenous representatives who hold
permanent participant status; and (3) several other nations and
international organizations as observers. 159 The breadth of the
Council's reach can be seen in its sub-bodies, which include the Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic
Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and
Response (EPPR); Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
(PAME); Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG, dealing
with health, telemedicine, cultural tourism and transportation); and
160
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA).
The Council's major project has been its evaluation and
synthesis of knowledge on climate variability, climate change, and
increased ultraviolet radiation, with discussion of consequences for
environmental, human health, social, and economic impacts that led
to, among other things, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
(ACIA). 16 1 PAME is responsible for Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines,
the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, and the Arctic Marine Shipping
Assessment. 162 AMAP assesses the health and ecological risks
associated with contamination from radioactive waste, heavy metals,
persistent organic pollutants (POPs), and other contaminants; it has
also issued an action plan for the control of land-based sources of
Arctic marine pollution, among other activities. 163 EPPR has issued a
Field Guide for Oil Spill Response in Arctic Waters, an Arctic
Shoreline Clean-up Assessment Technique Manual, Guidelines for
the Transfer of Refined Oil and Oil Products in Arctic Waters (with
PAME), and a set of circumpolar maps of Resources at Risk from Oil
CAFF works for the conservation of
Spills in the Arctic. 164

159.
160.
161.
ACIA).

Arctic Council, supra note 144.
Id.
See Weller et al., supra note 9, at 990 (summarizing the conclusions of the

162.

See generally ARCTIC COUNCIL, PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENV'T,

ARCTIC OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES (2009), available at http:f/arcticcouncil.org/filearchive/Arctic%200ffhsore%200il%20and%2OGas%2OGuidelines%20200
9.pdf; ARCTIC COUNCIL, PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENV'T, ARCTIC MARINE
SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT (2009), available at http://web.arcticportal.org/
enlpame/amsa-2009-report [hereinafter AMSE Report]; Arctic Council, Protection of
the Arctic Marine Env't, PAME Work Plan 2009-2011, at 1 (2009), http://arctic(discussing objectives and
council.org/filearchive/ pame-work-plan_2009-2011.pdf
actions of PAME).
163.
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), http://www.amap.no/
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
(EPPR),
and
Response
Preparedness
Emergency
Prevention,
164.
http://eppr.arctic-council.org/ (lasted visited Oct. 3, 2009).
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biodiversity in the Arctic by supporting an international network of
165
protected areas and through other conservation practices.
Although the Arctic Council does not have the authority to make
binding law or regulations, its recommendations may become binding
through incorporation in other mechanisms. 16 6 The Arctic Council
has an Indigenous Peoples Secretariat that compiles information and
167
develops recommendations for the Council.
Other cooperative and consultative bodies are also active. The
Nordic Council includes several EU member states (Denmark,
Finland, and Sweden), Norway, Iceland, and autonomous territories
of Greenland (the Faroe Islands and Aland Islands). 168 The Barents
Euro-Arctic Council provides a mechanism for cooperation in the
Barents region. 16 9 This body, which is organized on two levels-one
intergovernmental and the other interregional-includes a working
group of Indigenous Peoples, and its major goal is sustainable
development through closer contact and cooperation. 170
The
Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians includes parliamentarians
from the eight Arctic states and the European Parliament, permanent
171
participants representing indigenous peoples, and other observers.
The Northern Forum links subnational and regional governments in
the region. 172 The Inuit Circumpolar Conference, an international
non-governmental organization representing approximately 150,000
Inuit from Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka in Russia,
works in the areas of environment and sustainable development,
international development, human rights and communications, and
cultural and social issues. It cooperates with the Saami Council, the
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON),
and other indigenous groups. 173 Many other bodies also exist. The
Arctic Council and other institutional arrangements such as theselikely in strengthened form-will be important in dealing with the
challenges of the twenty-first century.

165.
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), http://caff.arcticportal.org/
index.php?option=com content&view=category&layout=blog&id=4&Itemid= 18
(last
visited Oct. 3, 2009).
166.
See Lawson Brigham, Arctic Shipping Scenarios and Coastal State
Challenges, 7 WMU J. MAR. AFF. 476, 483 (2008) (discussing the need for Arctic states
to work within the IMO to develop a set of binding ship guidelines).
167.
See Csonka & Schweitzer, supra note 83, at 57, 210 (providing examples of
how they have collected information).
168.
Norden, About Nordic Cooperation, http://www.norden.org/enlabout.nordicco-operation (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
169.
Csonka & Schweitzer, supra note 83, at 124.
170.
Id. at 216.
171.
Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians (CPAR), http://www.arcticparl.org/
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
172.
Csonka & Schweitzer, supra note 83, at 211.
173.
Id. at 182.
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B. Need for New Arrangements or Agreements
In addition to the agreements, rules, and guidelines already in
existence, the challenges created by warming call for further
cooperative responses in specific areas. First, as maritime traffic and
tourism increase, maritime safety and security must be strengthened.
The recently released U.S. Arctic Policy statement notes that "safe,
secure, and environmentally sound maritime commerce in the Arctic
depends on infrastructure to support shipping activity, search and
rescue capability, short and long-range aids to navigation, high-risk
area vessel-traffic management, iceberg warnings and other sea ice
information, effective shipping standards, and measures to protect
the marine environment."'174
Search and rescue systems, other
navigation aids, and systems for environmental response must be
strengthened and coordinated, and it will likely be necessary for some
rules that are now voluntary to be reconstituted in mandatory
1
form. 75

Opportunities and needs also exist for greater scientific
cooperation on Arctic issues, both among the Arctic coastal states and
with other interested countries. For example, "the United States has
made significant investment in the infrastructure needed to collect
environmental data in the Arctic, including the establishment of
portions of an Arctic circumpolar observation network through a
partnership among United States agencies, academic collaborators,
and Arctic residents." 176
Achieving a cooperative, international
Arctic Observing Network is now a key activity of the International
177
Polar year.
Finally, additional agreements and arrangements will be needed
for the protection of marine resources and the marine environment
with regard to uses such as oil and gas exploration and exploitation,
shipping, and fishing. The Ministers at Ilulissat highlighted their
"stewardship role" in protecting the Arctic Ocean's unique
ecosystem. 178 As noted above, the Arctic Council enhanced the
previous Arctic Off-Shore Oil and Gas Guidelines for adoption by
Arctic ministers in April 2009.179
The Arctic Marine Shipping
Assessment made recommendations on additional rules and
regulations related to shipping activity.18 0
New agreements or
arrangements will also be necessary to conserve fish stocks and
protect ocean ecosystems as more fishing occurs in the area. The

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Directive on Arctic Region Policy, supra note 137, at 51.
See id. (discussing how to achieve effective search and rescue systems).
Id. § E.3.
Brigham, supra note 166, at 484.
Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 158, at para. 5.
ARCTIC OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES, supra note 162, 7.
AMSE Report, supra note 162, at 6-7.
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United States Congress recognized the need for international
cooperation on fisheries when it passed Senate Joint Resolution 17
(now Public Law 110-243), which directs the United States to initiate
international discussions for an agreement to manage migratory and
transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean.1 81 In addition, in
February 2009, the North Pacific Management Council adopted a
Fishery Management Plan that prohibits U.S. fishing in the area
north of the Bering Strait and north of Alaska until regulations can
18 2
be put in place to ensure sustainability.
Based on scientific advice, policymakers need to move
expeditiously to develop and implement legally binding measures for
the regulation of oil and gas, shipping, and fishing activities in the
Arctic. These measures may be put into place through existing
mechanisms, such as the IMO, or through other appropriate
agreements or arrangements.
In view of the sensitivity and
interconnectedness of all aspects of the Arctic marine environment,
the variety of anticipated human impacts, and the fact that few
legally binding arrangements now exist with regard to protection of
these ocean areas, a significant opportunity and challenge exist to
craft these arrangements based upon the expressed goal of ecosystembased management.1 8 3 At a minimum, each individual regime should
incorporate ecosystem-based management principles and obligations.
A more forward looking goal would be to attempt to integrate
management across and among all these uses on an ecosystem basis
through a unified regional ecosystem management agreement or a
coordinated set of specific agreements.

IV. CONCLUSION

Arctic warming is having and will continue to have numerous
effects on the Arctic environment, residents, and nations-effects that
may be both negative and positive. Melting ice and sea level rise
affect marine ecosystems, marine life, and the animals and people
who depend on those resources for their survival; they are also
causing erosion and related damage to coastal communities and
areas. Thawing permafrost is impairing housing and infrastructure
on land. Arctic freshwater systems, terrestrial ecosystems, and
related flora and fauna are also changing. The human implications of

181.
Managing Migratory and Transboundary Fish Stocks in the Arctic Ocean,
Pub.L. No. 110-243, 122 Stat. 1569 (2008).
182.
North Pacific Fishery Management Council Closes Arctic for Fishing,
CONVERANET, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.converanet.com/agriculturelblog/north-pacificfishery-management-council-closes-arctic-fishing.
183.
See, e.g., Directive on Arctic Region Policy, supra note 137, at 54 ("Pursue
marine ecosystem-based management in the Arctic.").
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these environmental changes include direct and indirect effects on
access to food and resources; health and well-being; and community
cohesion, traditions, and culture. The complexity of interacting
factors involved, the regional variations within the Arctic, and the
fact that much is still unknown about the operation of climate and
environmental systems in the region make definitive specific
predictions difficult. Without question, however, the scope and
rapidity of change in the twenty-first century will test the adaptive
capacities of the environment itself and of the Arctic residents and
nations.
Increased transportation and resource access in the Arctic
brought about by warming, as well as increased activity along
national borders, will also create needs for additional maritime
presence and security; improved environmental and safety regulation;
peaceful resolution of boundary disputes and jurisdictional issues;
and increased homeland security, law enforcement, immigration,
public health, and related activities. Responses to many of these
environmental, human, and security issues must be cooperative and
international and should involve the voices of Arctic indigenous
residents. Such responses can be accomplished within existing legal
and institutional frameworks by further strengthening of institutions,
but they will also necessarily involve the development of new legally
binding agreements or arrangements for regulation of certain
activities such as shipping, oil and gas exploration and exploitation,
and fishing. In view of the numerous and substantial challenges
facing the fragile Arctic environment, it will be incumbent on
policymakers and negotiators to ensure that these new regulatory
arrangements provide strong protections for Arctic ecosystems and
the Arctic people.

